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A REEXAMINATION OF STANDING TO SUE UNDER
SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT-
BOSHES v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.1
Roger Boshes and four other purchasers at retail of General Motors
automobiles filed a private treble damage antitrust action under section
4 of the Clayton Act.2 Plaintiffs alleged that General Motors Corporation
;and certain of its dealers combined and conspired to fix the retail prices
and the terms of sale on automobiles manufactured and sold by various
divisions of General Motors Corporation in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.3 Plaintiffs contended that by virtue of the "General Mo-
tors Holding Plan," a plan by which General Motors organizes and fi-
nances dealerships, approximately 1600 General Motors dealers were
forced by their manufacturer to maintain artificially high prices4 and that
a portion of -the retail prices paid by plaintiffs, and others similarly
situated, for automobiles constituted an illegal overcharge attributable to
General Motors' alleged anti-competitive practices. 5 Plaintiffs' motion
-that the action be certified as a class action under Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 the proposed plaintiff class to consist of
all purchasers of General Motors automobiles from 1965 until the certi-
fication of the proposed class, was denied on the ground of class unman-
ageability.7
1. Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. fl. 1973).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) which provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
4. The complaint asserted that the General Motors financed dealers were not
free to reduce their prices "because such dealers must make enough profit to retire
their financing debt." 59 F.R.D. at 591.
5. Id. at 590-91.
6. FEj. R. Civ. P. 23.
7. 59 F.R.D. at 599. While conceding that size alone "will not generally be
enough to make a class unmanageable," the court noted that a conservative estimate
of the proposed plaintiff class would number somewhere between 30 and 40 million
persons and that class members would be found in every state and a number of for-
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The significance of the Boshes decision lay in the court's denial of Gen-
eral Motors' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue. In denying the motion, Judge Bernard Decker
held that indirect purchasers of a product allegedly the subject of a price
fixing conspiracy or those not in privity with the alleged price fixer may
have standing to sue under section 4 of the Clay-ton Act, thus rejecting
a substantial line of cases which has denied indirect purchasers standing
as a matter of 'law. This note will assess the significance of the Boshes
decision as it relates to the question of standing to sue under section 4
of the Clayton Act and will assess the impact that the decision will have
and has already had in the area of treble damage antitrust actions.
In its motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the defendant argued that
under Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.8 retail con-
sumers as indirect purchasers do not, as a matter of law, have standing
under section 4 of the Clayton Act to bring suit against a manufacturer
for alleged price fixing violations. Judge Decker, in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of standing, squarely and significantly rejected,
for the first time, 9 the Mangano Line'9 of cases, which interpreted Han-
eign countries. Therefore, the court asserted, "[i]t would place an impossible bur-
den upon any court to provide adequate notice to a proposed class of [that] size
and thereafter to attempt to assemble and classify the transactional material required
to identify the particular interests of the millions of purchasers over ... " the span
of the damage period.
8. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
9. Prior decisions have arguably rejected the Mangano reading of Hanover Shoe
by implication. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14
(1972) (impliedly rejected any reading of Hanover Shoe establishing a direct-pur-
chaser or privity standing requirement by citing with approval South Carolina Coun-
cil of Milk Producers v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 419 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 934 (1966) and Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.
1967), two cases advocating the "target area" standing test); Perkins v. Standard
Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969) (involved alleged price discriminations in vio-
lation of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by § 13 of the Robinson-Patman
Act and argued forcefully by analogy against any direct-purchaser or privity stand-
ing limitation in treble damage antitrust suits). The Ninth and Second Circuits
have also impliedly rejected any direct-purchaser or privity standing requirement by
adopting "target area" standing tests which generally inquire whether the plaintiff
was within that area of the economy which was endangered or who could reason-
ably be foreseen to be affected by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a partic-
ular industry. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d
Cir. 1971) which held the cost-plus exception of Hanover Shoe applicable to the
facts at bar, but contained language indicating that offensive use of the pass-on doc-
trine was permissible to establish plaintiff standing and thus impliedly disapproved
any direct purchaser privity requirement; and Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 433
F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970), reh'g denied, 1971 Trade Cas. 73,247 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431
F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1969). Moraine Prod. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 1972 Trade Cas.
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over Shoe as establishing a highly restrictive direct-purchaser or privity
%l 73,812 (N.D. Ill. 1971) also impliedly rejecting any direct-purchaser or privity re-
quirement by adopting a "foreseeability" test which inquired whether injury to the
plaintiff was "reasonably foreseeable."
Also in connection with implied rejection of the Mangano reading of Hanover
Shoe, see in re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972) re-
garding certification of a consumer class and nationwide wholesaler-retailer class;
Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus. Inc., Civ. No. 67-486-JE (S.D. Fla.
1971) where the judge by unpublished order filed February 24, 1972, denied defend-
ants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a separate trial of theliability issue where there was no privity between plaintiff City of North Bay Vil-
lage and any of the defendants; and the public works contracts entered into between
the plaintiff City and the contractors were not cost-plus contracts. See also In
re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 313, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) where thejudge rejected defendants' motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment, against the
insurers of ultimate drug consumers, who were far removed from the conspiratorial
manufacturers, stating "that the resolution of the standing/remoteness/pass-on
issues as they relate to this litigation must also await further development of the
factual context in which they arise."; City of Austin v. United Concrete Pipe Corp.,
Case No. CA-3-228 (N.D. Tex. 1971) where Judge Taylor by unpublished orderdated November 9, 1971 rejected a defense motion for summary judgment regarding
"indirect" purchases; and In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278(S.D.N.Y. 1971) where a class action was held maintainable on behalf of purchasers
of broad spectrum antibiotics at the retail level for human consumption.
10. Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50
F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aHf'd sub nom., Mangano v. American Radiator &Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971) (denied standing to plain-
tiff homeowners as indirect purchasers of plumbing fixtures); Donson Stores, Inc.
v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (bread consumers denied
standing as indirect purchasers); New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Civil No.
8909 (D.N.M., unpublished order filed June 1, 1972) (denied standing to indirect
purchasers of asphalt); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Prod. Corp., 1972 Trade
Cas. I 74,235 (N.D. Calif. 1972) (heating contractors and building owners not
allowed to maintain class action against producers of gas vent pipe and fittings be-
cause of lack of privity with defendants); City of Akron v. Laub Baking Co., 1972
Trade Cas. 73,930 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (denied standing to all indirect purchasers
of bread); Travis v. Fairmont Foods Co., 346 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (milk
consumers denied standing as indirect purchasers); City and County of Denver v.
American Oil, 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971) (indirect purchasers of asphalt de-
nied standing); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (the court dismissed claims of purchasers of finished animal feed products
containing the antibiotics, but recognized the standing of wholesalers, veterinarians
who purchased directly or indirectly, and purchasers for manufacture or use who
purchased the antibiotics for non-human use from wholesalers in the same form as
originally sold by the defendant manufacturers); Maricopa County v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (denied
standing to plaintiff public bodies which contracted for the construction of public
buildings because indirect purchasers of plumbing fixtures); United Egg Producers
v. Bauer International Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (denied standing
to ultimate consumers of eggs because indirect purchasers).
This so-called Mangano Line transforms the classic factual issue of proximate
cause of damages into an inflexible principle of law that no one but the immediate
purchaser has standing to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act, except in situa-
tions where a cost-plus contract or analogous fixed mark-up type arrangement exists.
standing requirement, in treble damage antitrust actions."
The Mangano Line's reading of Hanover Shoe requires that only those
persons who purchase the product directly from the alleged antitrust viola-
tor have standing to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act unless a cost-
plus contract or analogous fixed mark-up type arrangement is involved.
Indirect purchasers or those further removed from the alleged violator in
the manufacturing-distribution chain are denied standing as a matter of
law.12 Judge Decker clearly indicates that analysis of the factual situa-
tion of each case and not application of preconceived determinations of
law should determine whether a plaintiff has been "injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.""1
Plaintiffs in Boshes, as retail consumers of a product marketed in the
same form that it was in when sold by the alleged antitrust violator, are
held to be not "too remote" to have standing.' 4
In Hanover Shoe, Hanover brought suit against United under section
4 of the Clayton Act for alleged price fixing violations resulting from
United's refusal to sell shoe machinery to Hanover. As a defense, United
claimed that Hanover, lessee of United's shoe machinery during the dam-
age period, had not sustained any injury because Hanover passed on the
full amount of any alleged price over-charge by United in the prices Han-
over charged its customers for shoes. The Court held, inter alia, that
this so called "pass-on" defense was no longer available in treble damage
antitrust actions except in those situations in which it is easily provable
that the person in privity with the alleged price fixer has suffered no dam-
ages, as where an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing cost-plus contract
or other analogous fixed mark-up arrangement.' 5 The Hanover court re-
11. "In fact," asserts Judge Decker, "this court has searched in vain for any dis-
cussion of the question of standing in the Hanover Shoe opinion." 59 F.R.D. at
595.
12. Since there is practically no industry in which any significant portion of pro-
duction is sold by the manufacturer directly to the ultimate consumer, there exists
no privity with the manufacturer as to the majority of consumer purchasers. Thus,
the Mangano Line's privity requirement for all practical purposes destroys the possi-
bility of consumer suits, under section 4 of the Clayton Act. See Plaintiffs' Memo-
randum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing at
12-13, Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Judge Decker's factual approach to standing to sue
under the Clayton Act is very much in harmony with the reasoning of recent deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court which have considered the standing issue
in other contexts and have emphasized the importance of the "injury in fact" com-
ponent. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Barlow v. Collins,
397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 15 (1970).
See also Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
14. 59 F.R.D. at 597.
15. 392 U.S. at 494. In pre-Hanover Shoe days defense attorneys would attempt
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jected United's pass-on defense on the grounds that establishing such a
price pass-on would require a convincing showing of virtually unascertain-
able or at best highly speculative data. Justice White indicated that
"even if it could be shown the buyer raised his price in response to, and
in the amount of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total
sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insu-
perable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not
or would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge or maintained
the higher price had ,the overcharge been discontinued."'16 The Court
further indicated that generally allowing such a defense would, as a prac-
tical matter, reduce effective private enforcement of the antitrust laws by,
in many cases, placing ultimate consumers who would have little mone-
tary stake in bringing a law suit and little interest in attempting a class
action, in the sole position to sue price fixers.17
In the Mangano Line of cases, Hanover Shoe was also interpreted to
prohibit the offensive'8 use of the passing-on concept to establish the
standing of an indirect purchaser. Judge Decker, in Boshes, indicates
that any such reading of Hanover Shoe is metamorphically incorrect.' 0
to illustrate that the plaintiff was not in fact injured by an alleged antitrust price
fixing violation because the plaintiff had "passed-on" his higher costs in the form
of higher prices to his customers situated further down the manufacturing-distribu-
tion chain. If the defense counsel was able to factually demonstrate that the full
amount of the alleged injury or price increase had been "passed-on," then the plain-
tiff, having suffered no injury, was adjudged to lack standing to sue and his suit
was dismissed. See, e.g., Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 164-65
(1922); Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918); North-
western Oil Co. v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 199 F.2d 747
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 56 F. Supp. 569 (D. Minn. 1944), affd, 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Leonard v. Sacony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F. Supp. 369
(W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942). See also Comment,
Standing Under Clayton Act § 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DiCK. L. REv. 73, 76-80
(1972).
16. 392 U.S. at 493.
17. Id. at 494.
18. Offensive use of the "pass-on" doctrine constitutes an assertion by an indi-
rect purchaser that he or she has been injured by an illegal overcharge of the alleged
antitrust price fixer because the overcharge has been passed down the manufactur-
ing-distribution chain to him or her. It is an argument utilized by prospective plain-
tiffs to establish their standing to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act. For an
excellent discussion of offensive use of the "pass-on" concept see Note, The Effect
of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-On Doctrine 46 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 98 (1972).
19. It should be noted that Boshes was not the first post-Hanover Shoe case to
indicate that offensive use of the "pass-on" concept was permissible. See, e.g., West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971).
The Boshes court notes that Justice White in his Hanover Shoe opinion
offered two reasons for general rejection of the pass-on defense:20 1) he
foresaw a great increase in the complexity of antitrust litigation if the de-
fense was generally confirmed due to the complexity of proof necessary
to establish a pass-on of increased costs and the impracticability of prov-
ing such a pass-on;2' and 2) he recognized a need to preserve the effec-
tiveness of the private antitrust enforcement mechanism. 22 These reasons
were inextricably interrelated-a fact all but ignored by the Mangano
Line in its interpretation of Hanover Shoe. As one commentator has sug-
gested, "The court's emphasis on problems of proof reflected its concern
that the attempt to establish a pass-on would so bog down the litigation
process as to undermine the efficacy of the private enforcement mechan-
ism."'23 The Boshes court siezes upon the two reasons enunciated in the
Hanover Shoe opinion for the Supreme Court's general rejection of the
pass-on defense and "adapts" them in an offensive pass-on context as im-
portant policy guides to be carefully weighed in analyzing the factual sit-
uation of each treble damage antitrust case to determine whether the
plaintiff has standing to sue. In other words, under Boshes the necessity
for there being some practical method of tracing an alleged price over-
charge, and fostering private enforcement of the antitrust laws, are policy
constructs to ,be considered and applied to the factual circumstances of
each case in arriving at a standing determination. Boshes indicates that
when a product is purchased by a plaintiff in the same form it was in
when sold by the alleged antitrust violator the problem of tracing any price
overcharge is de minimus and plaintiff's standing is, as a practical matter,
a foregone conclusion. Judge Decker rejects any reading of Hanover
Shoe which creates a direct purchaser or privity standing requirement as
an unwarranted attempt to transform a rejection of a defense because it
unduly hampered antitrust enforcement into a reason for a threshold re-
fusal to entertain the claims of a certain class of plaintiffs, and as an at-
20. 59 F.R.D. at 594.
21. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 493, 494
(1968).
22. Id. Public-judicial policy clearly favors vigorous private enforcement of the
antitrust laws. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318
(1965); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 564-68
(1951); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947).
See also the analysis of the United States Supreme Court's attitude in West Virginia
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
23. Comment, Mangano and Ultimate Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the
Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 394, 408 (1972).
1974] CASE NOTES 1337
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
tempt to turn the Hanover Shoe decision and its underlying rationale on
its head. The Court refused to transform Hanover Shoe from a case ex-
tending liability under the Clayton Act into a case limiting liability.
While Boshes clearly rejects the direct-purchase or privity standing
theory of the Mangano Line, examination reveals that the actual disposi-
tion of the standing issue in several of those cases would probably have
been identical under the Boshes "factual analysis" test. For example,
in Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.24 and In
re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions25 indirect purchaser plaintiffs were in such
positions in the manufacturing-distribution chain that the tracing of any
price overcharge was highly impracticable, if not impossible. In both
cases, the product which was the subject of the alleged price fixing con-
spiracy was a relatively small component of the product actually pur-
chased by the plaintiff. The subject product had passed through a second
product market composed of competitive sellers making independent pric-
ing decisions so as to obscure any effect an alleged subject product price
fixing conspiracy might have had on the price of the product actually pur-
chased by the plaintiff.26 In light of these facts, application of the policy
constructs discussed in Boshes would probably have also resulted in denial
of plaintiffs' standing. Unlike the purchasers in Boshes, these plaintiffs
purchased the subject product in a different form than it was in when
sold by the alleged price fixer.
On the other hand, the denial of standing to sue in several cases of
the Mangano Line appears to be in direct conflict with the Boshes ration-
ale. In these cases,27 there existed no significant overcharge tracing prob-
24. 438 F.2d 1187 (3rd Cir. 1971).
25. 333 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
26. Subject to similar analyses are: Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal Products
Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,235 (N.D. Calif. 1972) insofar as the case pertains
to builder-owner plaintiffs; Maricopa County v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
27. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (where ultimate consumers of bread were denied standing to sue); Bal-
mac, Inc. v. American Metal Products Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,235 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (where plaintiff heating contractors, who were denied standing, purchased
gas vent pipe and fittings which were the subject of the alleged price fixing con-
spiracy in the same form as sold by the alleged price fixer making any tracing of
the overcharge problem de minimus); City of Akron v. Laub Baking Co., 1972
Trade Cas. 73,930 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (where ultimate consumers, who were de-
nied standing, purchased bread, buns and other baked goods in the same form as
sold by the alleged price fixer making any tracing problem de minimus). Subject
to similar analysis are: Travis v. Fairmont Foods, 346 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa.(J72) (where milk consumers were denied standing); United Egg Producers v.
Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (where ultimate consumers
of eggs were denied standing to sue).
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lem. The plaintiffs, like the Boshes plaintiffs, purchased the products
which were the subject of the alleged price fixing conspiracies in the same
form the products were in when sold by the alleged price fixers. These
products passed through no independent competitive product markets
where independent pricing decisions were made which obscured any of-
fensive pass-on of price overcharge. Despite these facts, plaintiffs were
denied standing to sue. Accordingly, the conflict between the Boshes
"factual analysis" test and the privity theory of the Mangano Line mani-
fests itself on a dispositive as well as theoretical plane.
Since the Boshes decision, United States District Courts in the Southern
District of Ohio 28 and the District of Connecticut29 have cited with ap-
proval the reasoning of Boshes regarding the necessity of a factual ap-
proach to the standing issue and/or its rejection of the Mangano Line.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also reaf-
firmed its "target area" test in language which clearly rejects any reading
of Hanover Shoe as establishing a direct purchaser or privity standing re-
quirement. 30  Indeed, State v. Standard Oil of California"l reversing
In re Western Liquid Asphalt32 directly rejects the privity direct purchaser
standing theory of the Mangano Line.3
In re Western Liquid Asphalt denied standing to indirect purchasers
of liquid asphalt on the basis of the Mangano privity reading of Hanover
Shoe, explicitly citing the Mangano Line with approval.3 4 The appellate
court in State v. Standard Oil of California applying the "target area"
standing test, rejects this Mangano privity approach to standing as too
literal a reading of Hanover Shoe and cites the result and factual approach
of Boshes with approval.3 5 Judge Carter indicates that while the question
28. Bill Minnielli Cement Contracting, Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 1973
Trade Cas. 74,951 (S.D. Ohio, 1973) (distinguishes the factual situation of Bashes
from its own factual situation, primarily on the basis that the purchasers at bar were
not consumers of a product marketed in the same form that it was in when sold
by the alleged antitrust violator, as were the purchasers in Boshes).
29. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973 Trade Cas. 74,680 (D.C. Conn.
1973).
30. See, e.g., Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, M.D.L. No. 31 v. Automobile
Mfr. Ass'n Inc., 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973); Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vege-
table Ass'n, 484 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3459 (Feb.
19, 1974).
31. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973).
32. 350 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
33. Contra, New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Civil No. 8909 (D.N.M. un-
published order filed June 1, 1972); City and County of Denver v. Amer-
ican Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971).
34. 350 F. Supp. at 1373.
35. 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973).
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of whether appellants are clearly within the area of the economy which
appellees reasonably could have or did foresee would be endangered by
a breakdown of competitive conditions is one to be answered by the court
as a matter of law, the answer to the question is to be arrived at by the
court through factual analysis of the case at bar, and not by the applica-
tion of any preconceived legal principle.86
These cases following the lead of Boshes will hopefully mark the begin-
ning of the end for the overly restrictive privity or direct-purchaser stand-
ing test of the Mangano Line. Boshes has 'begun the move to restore the
standing to sue determination in treble damage antitrust actions to the
realm of factual analysis and policy application on a case by case basis.
If the Boshes view prevails, a so-called indirect purchaser will no longer
be denied standing to sue solely by virtue of his position in the manufac-
turing-distribution chain. Boshes and its progeny have finally rejected
the Mangano Line's erroneous interpretation of Hanover Shoe.
Gary L. Specks
36. Id. at 200.
1340 [Vol. 23
k-K'
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
1891-1974
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI
Scientific Approaches to Juvenile Delinquency and Criminality
Mr. Bassiouni is Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law,
where he teaches Criminal Law and International Law. He received his
LL.B. from Cairo University, his J.D. degree from Indiana University,
his LL.M. from John Marshall Law School, and his J.S.D. from George
Washington University. He is author of Criminal Law and Its Processes
(1969), The Law of Dissent and Riots (1970), and two volumes entitled
A Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973). In 1971 he was a Full-
bright-Hays Professor to Germany and in 1972 a guest scholar in the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
DONALD H. J. HERMANN
The Fallacy of Legal Procedure as Pre-Dominant over Substantive Justice:
A Critique of "The Rule of law" in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice
Mr. Hermann is Professor of Law at DePaul University. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University, his J.D. from Columbia Uni-
versity, and his LL.M. from Harvard University. During 1973-1974,
Mr. Hermann was a Harvard Fellow in Law and Humanities at Harvard
University. Professor Hermann teaches Antitrust, Criminal Law, Law
and the Humanities, and Law and Economics.
Mr. Hermann is a member of the state bars of Illinois, Kentucky, Wash-
ington, and Arizona, and the Bar of the United States Supreme Court.
He is the author of numerous scholarly articles and has edited several
collections of materials for law teaching.
ALAN F. SEWELL
Scientific Approaches to Juvenile Delinquency and Criminality
Mr. Sewell was an Assistant Professor of Psychology at DePaul Uni-
versity from which he obtained his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in Psychology.
He is presently a private consultant.
